Criminal Law: Habeas Corpus vs. Prison Regulations: A Struggle in Constitutional Theory by Roth, Robert C.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 1 Winter 1971 Article 5
Criminal Law: Habeas Corpus vs. Prison
Regulations: A Struggle in Constitutional Theory
Robert C. Roth
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Robert C. Roth, Criminal Law: Habeas Corpus vs. Prison Regulations: A Struggle in Constitutional Theory, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 50 (1971).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol54/iss1/5
NOTES
HABEAS CORPUS VS. PRISON REGULATIONS
A STRUGGLE IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations of our penal system.'
We think it is well settled that it is not the function of the
courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prison-
ers in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment
those who are illegally confined..2
Habeas Corpus is the remedy which the law gives for the
enforcement of the civil right of personal liberty, and resort
to it sometimes becomes necessary because of what is done
to enforce laws for the punishment of crimes. The judicial pro-
ceedings under it do not inquire into the criminal act which is
complained of but into the right to liberty notwithstanding the
act.'
The foregoing is illustrative of the ever recurring problem fac-
ing those administering criminal justice. That is to say, a constitu-
tionally sound yet workable method of striking a balance between
(1) the post-conviction powers of a court of law, (2) prison regu-
lations necessary to effect orderly prison management, and (3) the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of convicted individuals. This
article attempts to discuss the developments which have taken
place in this area. Primary emphasis is in the areas of: (1) the
expanded use of the federal writ of habeas corpus, (2) the develop-
ment of the next of friend theory, (3) the use of prison regulations
resulting in a direct denial of access to the courts, and (4) prison
regulations making such access difficult but not impossible.
EXPANDED USE OF FEDERAL WRIT
Since its establishment in England in 1679, the writ of habaes corpus
has been considered one of the bulwarks of personal freedom.4 This
I Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
2 Stroud v. Swope, Warden, 187 F.2d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 1951).
3 Ex parte Ton Tong, 108 U.S. 556 (1883).
4 Blackstone describes the following common law versions of the habeas corpus
writ:(1) Habeas corpus ad respondenmon. Issued "when a man hath a cause of
action against one who is confined by the process of some inferior court; in
order to remove the prisoner, and charge him with this new action in the
court above."(2) Habeas corpus ad satisfaciandum. Issued "when a prisoner hath had
judgment against him in an action, and the plaintiff is desirous to bring him
up to some superior court to charge him with process of execution."(3) Habeas corpus ad prosequendum, testificanduin, deliberandum, etc. Issued
"when it is necessary to remove a prisoner, in order to prosecute or bear
testimony in any court, or to be tried in the proper jurisdiction wherein the
fact was committed."
HABEAS CORPUS
remedy was so firmly imbedded in the traditions of American colonial
justice that the framers of the United States Constitution expressly
provided for the writ in that document. 5 Not only is the writ specifically
included in the United States Constitution, but many states have
seen fit to incorporate it into their constitutions and statutes 7 as
well.
The prerequisites for obtaining a writ of habeas corpus are
quite similar both at the federal8 and state9 level. Frequently
federal questions arise and are decided in state courts. In these
cases the right to petition for the writ may initially arise in the
state court 0 and ultimately be decided in a federal court. The state
court in deciding a federal question will apply the federal law which
governs the issue. In the event of an unfavorable decision at this
level, the defendant may appeal within the state court system."' At
any time prior to entry of a final state-court judgment (appeal op-
portunities having elapsed) a defendant may seek a state writ of
(4) Habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum. This "issues out of any of
the courts of Westminster Hall, when a person is sued in some inferior
jurisdiction, and is desirous to remove the action into the superior court;
commanding the inferior judges to produce the body of the defendant, to-
gether with the day and cause of his caption and detainer, (whence the writ
is frequently denominated an habeas corpus curn causa) to do and receive
whatsoever the king's court shall consider in that behalf."
(5) Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. The "great and efficacious writ," which
is "directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention,
ad faciendum, subjicienduin, et recipiendum, to do, submit to, and receive
whatsoever the judge or court awarding such writ shall consider in that
behalf." 3 Blackstones Commentaries 129-132; Chief Justice Marshall ex-
amines these writs in relation to the American judicial system in EX parte
Bolinan, 4 Cranch 75, 97 (1807).
5 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. U.S.
CONST. Art. I, § 9.
6 ILL. CoNST. Art. I § 7; MIcH. CoNsT. Art. I, § 2; Wis. CONST. Arts I, § 8.
7WIs. STAT. § 292 (1967).
$ The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless .... (3) He
is in custody of the United States; .... 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1959).
9 Every person restrained of his liberty, except by virtue of any competent
tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction . . . Wis. STAT. § 292.02 (1967), may
prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from such restraint. Wis.
STAT. § 292.01 (1967).
10 At common law and in the early developmental stages of the writ of habeas
corpus in Wisconsin, judicial errors as distinguished from jurisdictional errors
were not reached or considered by the writ of habeas corpus. In re Milburn,
59 Wis. 24, 17 N.W. 965 (1883). See also ex rel. Morgan v. Fischer, 238
Wis. 38, 298 N.W. 353 (1941) ; Larson v. State ex rel. Bennett, 221 Wis. 188,
266 N.W. 170 (1936). Recent decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court have
enlarged the scope and purpose of the writ. Habeas corpus now lies to review
violations of constitutional rights regardless of whether they are judicial orjurisdictional. State ex tel. Goodchild v. Burke 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d
753 (1965) ; Wolke v. Fleming, 24 Wis. 2d 606, 129 N.W.2d 841 (1964) ; Babbit
v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 446, 127 N.W.2d 405 (1964) ; State el rel. Burnett v. Burke,
22 Wis. 2d 486, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1964).
i1 Under Wisconsin's newly enacted Criminal Code which took effect July 1,
1970, a post-conviction remedy statute (WIs. STAT. § 274.06) is now in exist-
ence. This statute is a combination of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the Uniform Post
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habeas corpus. 12 Upon a final determination of the issue in the
state-court system the defendant may petition the United States
Supreme Court either by direct appeal or certiorari. Prior to Brown v.
Allen'3 an affirmance on appeal or a denial of certiorari would have
finally determined the controversy. There was no way of collater-
ally attacking the state supreme court judgment.
Brown held that a state prisoner could seek and automatically
obtain federal district court collateral review of the merits of any
constitutional question which may have arisen in the state court
system, even though such issue had been fully and fairly adjudi-
cated. This review was to be obtained by petition for a federal writ
of habeas corpus.
The expanded use of the writ and the expanded federal jurisdic-
tion it entails have been the subject of much debate in legal circles.
The controversy revolves primarily around the wisdom of federal
interference with state administration of criminal justice and the
devastating effect federal collateral review has on the time-honored
principle of finality of judgments. The relatively recent United
States Supreme Court cases of Fay v. Noia,14 Townsend v. Sain,15
and Sander v. United States16 have re-examined and redefined the
procedural aspects of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. In each
case the collateral review procedure established in Brown was up-
held as being a necessary safeguard of constitutional rights. In 1966
Conviction Procedure Act.
The remedy is invoked by motion to the trial court and provides for
appointment of counsel. All questions available to the prisoner must be raised
in the initial motion.
Although Wis. STAT. § 292.03 (as amended July 1, 1970) which is Wiscon-
sin's habeas corpus statute, merely states that a prisoner's application for a
writ must contain a copy of any motion made pursuant to Wis. STAT. §
974.06 and the disposition of the writ, or state that no motion was made; it
seems clear that Wis. STAT. § 974.06(8) makes this procedure a prerequisite
for application for any writ (state or federal), unless the motion is inade-
quate or ineffective (ie. detention before trial).
The statute attempts to supplant state habeas corpus and makes resort
to this post-conviction remedy procedure a prerequisite to gaining a federal
writ of habeas corpus. It provides an excellent opportunity for state judges
to correct court errors, thus lessening the necessity of federal interference.
The post-conviction remedy procedure as a prerequisite to gaining a federal
writ has basis in Constitutional precedent under the exhaustion of state rem-
edies theory. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
The procedure has also been held not to be an abridgment of the defend-
ant's right to habeas corpus. See Stirone v. Markley, 345 F.2d 473 cert. den.
382 U.S. 829 (1965).
12 In the very recent case of State ex rel. Schof v. Schubert, 45 Wis. 2d 644,
173 N.W.2d 673 (1970) the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared a portion of
WIS. STAT. § 292.01(2) (1967) to be unconstitutional. The ground of attack
was that a portion of the statute purported to deny inmates the right to
habeas corpus to test the validity of their commitments.
13 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
14 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See note 11.
is 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
16373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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the federal habeas corpus statute was amended. The amendment did
not result in a curtailment of habeas corpus. Rather, it served to estab-
lish fundamental guidelines for examination of the factual allegations
in the petition'17 and to formulate a policy for the disposition of succes-
sive federal petitions.:"
There are indications of continued use of the federal writ in its
expanded capacity. This is evidenced by the steadily increasing number
of petitions for federal writs over the past twenty years. No doubt
this is in part due to the Brozmr v. A11en 9 decision and in no small
measure to the ever-expanding limits of the Fourteenth Amendment.20
Through the due process and equal protection clauses, the United States
Supreme Court has guaranteed to the accused the right to counsel,2'
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure,22 a privilege against
self-incrimination, 23 freedom from undue trial and pre-trial publicity,2 4
the right to a speedy trial2-, the right to a jury,26 the right to confront
his accuser 27 and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment . 2  This
marked trend will undoubtedly continue until the individual states
assume the task of safeguarding the constitutional rights of all
their citizens not only by affording due process but by providing for an
all-inclusive post-conviction review procedure.
To institute a state or federal habeas corpus proceeding, it is neces-
sary for the prisoner to prepare a petition29 stating an arguably meri-
torious claim. Some courts, including the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
provide a standard form petition 0 to all prisoners who contact the
court either by letter or hand drafted petition. The prisoner who
1728 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended (Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 87-711 2).
1s 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended (Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-711 1).
19344 U.S. 443 (1953).
20 "[N]or shall any States deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
21 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California 372 U.S.
353 (1963).
22 Evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure is inadmissible in state courts
just as it was formerly inadmissible in federal courts. fapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). Hearsay information was not sufficient to show probable cause for
issuance of a search warrant. Spinnelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
In the absence of prior judicial authorization, the fruits of an electronic
surveillance are inadmissible as evidence. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
23 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).24 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
25 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
26 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
27 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
28 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2928 U.S.C. § 2242 (1959) ; WIs. STAT. § 292.04 (1970).
30The standard form was developed by the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. See Application for Writs of Habeas Corpus
and Post Conviction Review of Sentences in the United States Courts, 33
F.R.D. 363, 391, 393 (app. 2) (1963).
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cannot afford an attorney must complete the ten-page question-
naire without assistance. If no form is provided he must draft the
petition pro se. Not all inmates are capable of researching and drafting
the necessary petition.31 Many who do accomplish this task are unable
to comprehend the complex elements inherent in a question of fun-
damental constitutional rights. Some of these individuals are not
even able to recognize that a violation has taken place.
Recent interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment make it
clear that the illiterate and indigent, as well as the educated and
wealthy, are entitled to share equally in the bounty of fundamental
rights guaranteed to each individual by the United States Constitu-
tion. Often, however, in actual practice this goal is not achieved.
The application procedure in obtaining a writ of habeas corpus is
an excellent example.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEXT OF FRIEND
In Wisconsin, as in other state jurisdictions, 3 2 counsel will not
be appointed for an indigent until after the Supreme Court reviews
the petitioner's petition and determines his claim to be arguably
meritorious.3 3 The federal system parallels that of the states in that
there is no right to have counsel appointed at the petition stage of
a habeas corpus proceeding.34 Fortunately, the Federal Judiciary
Act provides a procedure by which a prisoner may seek the assist-
31 One of the questions on the standard form petition is: "State concisely the
grounds on which you base your allegation that you are being held in custody
unlawfully." Wis. Sup. Ct., Petition for Order to Show Cause for Writ of
Habeas Corpus by Person Serving Sentence, question 10, p. 3. In commenting
on Petition of Anderson, Wis. Sup. Ct., April 23, 1964 (unreported), Fair-
child, then a Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice, stated that the petition had
been denied "because it merely set forth conclusions and did not state the
necessary supporting facts." Fairchild, Post Conviction Rights and Remedies,
1965 Wis. L. REv. Y2, 59 (1965).
The task of producing an acceptable petition becomes insurmountable if
the prisoner lacks a fundamental grasp of the language. Studies indicate that
prisoners as a group are substantially less educated than the rest of society.
While one-half of one percent of the population is mentally defective, studies
show almost three times as many prisoners suffer from mental deficiencies.
For a thorough study of the educational and I.Q. level of prisoners in various
states, see Note, Constitutional Law: Prison "No-Assistance" Regulations and
the Jailhouse Lawyer, 1968 Dusca L. J. 343, n. 23, 24, 360 (1968).
32 See e.g., Barker v. Ohio, 330 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1964) ; People v. Shipman, 62
Cal. 2d 226, 397 P.2d 993 (1965).
33 The Wisconsin appointment of counsel procedure is based on Wis. STAT. §
957.26(3) (4) (1967). Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) held that
denial of counsel to an indigent during an appeal proceeding, which such
individual has as a matter of right, is discrimination and violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In an article in the Wisconsin Law Review, Thomas E. Fairchild, then
member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, stated ". . . our court does not
consider Douglas to require appointment [of counsel] as a matter of course
whenever a writ of habeas corpus is being sought." Fairchild, Post Conviction
Rights and Remedies, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 52, 56 (1965). See also Note, Wis-
consin Criminal Procedure, 1966 Wis. L. Rv. 430, 517, 518 (1966).
34 See e.g. United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404 (2nd Cir.
1964) ; Taylor v. Pegelow, 335 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1964).
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ance of another to aid in the preparation of the petition for a federal
writ of habeas corpus. It provides, "Application for a writ of habeas
corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person whose
relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf."35 (Emphasis
added.) In addition, many state courts have recognized the next of
friend petition by statute36 and decision.3 7
Although the courts recognize the next of friend petition, only a
few jurisdictions have initiated programs designed to provide as-
sistance to prisoners in drafting these petitions. 38 As a result, indi-
gent prisoners have only the prison "writ writer" upon whom to rely
for aid in gaining recognition of their claim. Justice Douglas' dissent
from the per curiam decision in Hackin v. Arizona&9 defends such non-
lawyer participation in quasi-legal matters. Hackin, a layman, after an
unsuccessful attempt to procure an attorney, represented an indigent
prisoner at a habeas corpus hearing. Hackin was consequently convicted
of a misdemeanor for practicing law without a license. Douglas pointed
to the severe shortage of legal assistance afforded to the poor and un-
educated. 40 To meet the urgent need, he argued for an expanded utiliza-
tion of lay persons. Petitions for habeas corpus because of their factual
nature, fall within the scope of work that a qualified layman can
handle. An acceptable petition can be drafted by a person with no
prior legal training. However before recognition is given, the courts
require that several conditions be fulfilled.
In United States ex rel Bryant v. Houston4l the writ petition
was prepared by a next of friend. The writ was dismissed upon an
order of the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
and the order was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit. The dismissal was not the result of the petition having been
prepared by someone other than the person in custody. The ground for
dismissal was that nowhere in her petition did the next of friend state
her identity, her relationship to the petitioner, that she was authorized
to act on the petitioner's behalf or the reason the petitioner did not sign
5 28 U.S.C. 2242 (1959).
36 Wis. STAT. § 292.03 (1967) reads in part: "Application for such writ shall be
by petition, signed either by the prisoner or by some person in his behalf ... "
37 See e.g., Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207 (1933) ; Nahl v. Delmore,
49 Wash. 2d 318, 301 P.2d 161 (1956).
ss One state provides local lawyers who make periodic visits to the state prison
to consult with prisoners on their habeas corpus petitions. Another state makes
use of senior law students to aid prisoners. In several states the public de-
fender program supplies attorneys to render assistance to prisoners in the
drafting of their petitions. For a complete study of the free programs avail-
able to prisoners at the pre-appointment stage, see Note, Constitutional Law:
Prison "No-Assistance" Regulations and the Jailhouse Lawyer. 1968 DuKE
L. J. 343, 349 n. 27 (1968).
39389 U.S. 143 (1967).
4o Id. at 147.
41273 F. 915 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1921).
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and verify the complaint. The court nevertheless gave explicit recogni-
tion to next of friend procedure and outlined the requirements for its
application.
The practice of a next of friend applying for a writ is ancient
and fully accepted. There are many instances and circum-
stances under which it may not be possible nor feasible that
the detained person shall sign and verify the complaint. In-
ability to understand the English language or situation,
particularly in the case of aliens, impossibility of access to
the person, or mental incapacity are all illustrations of a
proper use of the "next of friend" application.42
The dicta in United States ex rel Bryant v. Huston4 3 was followed
in Collins v. Traeger,44 which upheld the next of friend procedure in
the preparation of the habeas corpus petition. All that was alleged
by the next of friend was that the petition was made on behalf of and
at the request of the person held in custody.
Although the courts are willing to permit this limited practice
of law, regulations exist in both state45 and federal prisons which
prohibit prisoners from serving as next of friend for fellow prison-
ers or in any way assisting others in the preparation of petitions for
post-conviction relief. Such regulations have been found to be con-
stitutional when adjudicated at both the state and federal level.
The Supreme Court of California, in Application of Chessman,46
upheld the right of a prison to deny a prisoner consultation with a
certain attorney. The rationale for the refusal was that he was not the
attorney of record for the inmate. The court's position was based upon
two provisions in the California Penal Code which characterized an
inmate serving a life sentence as civilly dead.4 7 Any prisoner serving a
term less than life has his civil rights suspended during incarceration. 4
The court determined that Chessman, who was serving a life sentence,
was not claiming rights but special privileges. Denial of access to an
attorney not of record was held to be entirely reasonable.
The federal courts have allowed similar prison practices. Seqel
v. Ragen 9 upheld the action of the warden in abolishing a "legal depart-
ment" established by a prisoner who had studied the law of habeas
corpus extensively. The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Cir-
42Id. at 916.
43273 F. 915 (C.A. 2nd Cir. 1921).
-1 27 F.2d 842 (C.A. 9th Cir. 1928).
45 A no-assistance rule, while unwritten, has been enforced in Wisconsin prisons.
Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 514, 520, n. 17(1967).
4644 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955).
47 CAL. PEN. CODE, 2601 (West 1956).
48 CAL. PEN. CODE, 2600 (West 1956).
49 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950).
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cuit declared that "[o]bviously the right to practice law or maintain a
law department within the confines of a state penitentiary is not a right
secured by the Constitution of the United States."50
In Aust v. Harris5' a prisoner in his petition for habeas corpus
claimed that he was punished for doing legal work in his cell and
for exhibiting this work to other inmates. In response to the writ,
the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners introduced its regulations
which precluded inmates from serving each other as attorneys or
assisting each other in the preparation of legal documents. The
court found these regulations to be reasonable and in no way viola-
tive of any Constitutional rights of the inmates. "Except in excep-
tional circumstances not here present the Courts will not interfere
with uniformly applied institutional regulations governing the times
and places for preparing legal papers or governing inter-inmate
traffic in legal information or materials. '52
Judicial examination of these rules has been infrequent,53 and
often results are incongruous. A comparatively recent federal case
bears testimony to this incongruity. In Burnside v. Nebraska," a
prisoner sought the aid of a fellow inmate in preparation of a brief
and motion. Prison officials seized certain documents under authority of
a prison regulation 5 which denied to prisoners the assistance of their
fellow inmates in preparation of legal documents. After a hearing before
the deputy warden the offending prisoner was given a ninety-day re-
striction and forfeited thirty days of earned good time.56 At the hearing
on an application for a writ of habeas corpus the warden amended the
prison regulation to deny assistance of fellow prisoners in preparation
of legal documents unless specific written permission is obtained from
the warden. The presiding judge concluded that the former regulation
under which the prisoner was punished could not stand. He found the
regulation in its revised form to be reasonable on its face.
The judge refused to reinstate the prisoner's good time even
though he found the regulation under which punishment was dis-
pensed to be unreasonable and arbitrary.
Because the rule as it existed at the time of the hearing here-
in was arbitrary and unreasonable, it is urged by counsel
o Id. at 788.
51266 F. Supp. 304 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
52 Id. at 307.
53White v. Blockivell, 277 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Arey v. Peyton, 378
F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1967) ; Burnside v. Nebraska, 378 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1967) ;
Wilson v. Dixon, 256 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1958); Seigel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d
785 (7th Cir. 1950).
54 378 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1967).
55 "No inmate is permitted to assist another inmate in the preparation of legal
documents." Burnside v. Nebraska, 378 F.2d 915, 916 (8th Cir. 1967).56Accumulated good time reduces the length of the prisoner's sentence.
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that the good time should be reinstated. While the court has
some doubts on the matter, it concludes otherwise and
believes that petitioner should have made a request of the
Deputy Warden or Warden before violating the prison rules.
Had a request for assistance been made and denied, the
court might then have felt constrained to set aside the for-
feiture of good time. The fact is that prison rules are made to
be observed and prisoners cannot take the rules in their own
hands. The court will at all times protect their constitutional
rights and might see fit in the future to grant relief against
arbitrary or unwarranted action."57
John.-son v. Avery, 8 recently decided by the United States Supreme
Court, has resolved much of the conflict in the area of prison regula-
tions denying assistance in preparation of the petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. Johnson, an inmate in the Tennessee State Penitentiary,
and a self-styled "jailhouse lawyer", was placed in solitary confinement
for violating a prison regulation forbidding prisoners from assisting
one another in the application for writs of habeas corpus. The regula-
tion reads in part: "No inmate will advise, assist or otherwise contract
to aid another, either with or without fees, to prepare Writs or other
legal matters. ... Inmates are forbidden to set themselves up as practi-
tioners for the purpose of promoting a business of writing Writs."5 9
The Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
construed Johnson's motion for a typewriter and lawbooks as a
petition for habeas corpus and ordered Johnson released from soli-
tary confinement. 60 The court held the prison regulation void as an
interference with illiterate and indigent prisoners' right to federal
habeas corpus. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.61 On
certiorari, stressing the important function of habeas corpus and
the court's duty to maintain the writ unimpared, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state could not enforce a non-assistance
rule unless the state provided some alternative means of assisting
those prisoners who are poorly educated or illiterate.
The Court in Johnson was not oblivious to the disciplinary prob-
lems generated by writ writers,6 2 nor did it ignore the fact that
such writers frequently spawn frivolous claims and draft petitions
so unskilled as to be a burden on the courts. 63 Acknowledging the
57 Burnside v. Nebraska, 378 F.2d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 1967).
58 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
59 Id. at 484.
60 Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). Petition was based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and the 1964 Civil Rights Act.61 Johnson v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967).
62 "It is indisputable that prison 'writ writers' like petitioner are some times a
menace to prison discipline and that their petitions are often so unskillful as
to be a burden on the courts which receive them." Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483, 488 (1969). See e.g. Spector, A Prison Librarian Looks at Writ-Writing,
56 CALIF. L. REv. 365 (1968) ; 58 MIcH. L. REv. 1233 (1960).
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present appointment of counsel practice and the fact that prisons
accommodate a high percentage of inmates who are illiterate or
whose intelligence is limited,6 4 the Court stated that to deny these
prisoners the only help available is to effectively deny them their
Constitutional right to habeas corpus.6 5 The decision requires prison
officials to permit such assistance in the absence of alternative
means but emphasized that reasonable regulation of the practice
will be allowed. 6
Beyond the area of non-assistance, the courts have generally
taken a somewhat more predictable course of action. Where prison
regulations have denied access to the courts completely, the courts
have stricken them. If, however, the rules have merely made access
to the courts more difficult, they have been upheld.
DIRECT DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS
In Ex parte Hull6 7 a prisoner prepared a petition for habeas cor-
pus and requested that a prison official notarize it. The official not
only refused to do so, but in addition refused to mail it. The inmate
then attempted delivery to his father for mailing outside the prison.
A guard confiscated his petition. Petitioner prepared another one
which he managed to have his father file. This petition set out his
various efforts to file and the confiscation of his earlier petition.
At the application hearing the warden claimed justification for
his action in a prison regulation which required submission and
favorable action by the institutional welfare office before the peti-
tion could be filed. The United States Supreme Court had no
trouble finding the regulation invalid as a denial of the right of a state
prisoner to access to a federal court.6 s
The question of the right of access of a state prisoner to a state
court was considered in White v. Ragen.69 The state supreme court
refused to allow the filing of a petition for habeas corpus. The court
gave no reasons for its decision. They required no answer from the
respondent (warden) from which issues might have been framed
for determination at the hearing. The United States Supreme Court
reviewed the petition, found violations of the prisoner's Constitu-
tional rights as framed by his petition, and determined some court
63 See Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review, Report of the Committee
on Habeas Corpus, 33 F.R.D. 363, 384, 385, 410, 411 (1963).
64 See authorities cited, supra note 30.
65 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 489 (1969).
66 Id. at 490.
67312 U.S. 546 (1940).
68 "Whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is
properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are questions for that
court alone to determine. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1940).
69 324 U.S. 760 (1944).
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corrective process should be afforded. Because the state court
afforded no relief, the federal district court opened its doors to the
petitioner.
Stiltner v. Rhay70 found denial of access of a state prisoner to a
state court to be a direct violation of the commands of the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held depriva-
tion of the right of access to the courts is actionable under the Civil
Rights Act.7 ' If the right of access is not firmly protected the other
constitutional rights are merely meaningless phraseology.
The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
also been employed in cases where prison regulations impose re-
strictions upon the right of access. The petitioner in Dowd v. United
States ex rel. Cook12 was convicted of murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. He was immediately confined in the state peniten-
tiary. Under state law the petitioner was granted six months in which
to appeal. He prepared the proper appeal papers, but the warden, act-
ing pursuant to prison regulations, frustrated his attempts to file in
the state supreme court. After his appeal period had run, the ban
on sending papers from the prison was lifted. The petitioner filed
a delayed appeal which was denied. He subsequently filed for a
federal writ of habeas corpus.
The federal district court held there was a violation of the equal
protection of the law which the state could not remedy, and the
federal appellate court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court
restated the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment but remanded
to the state court. Although the court recognized that the denial of
access was a Constitutional violation it felt an adequate remedy would be
access to the state court on appeal.
In Smith v. Bennet,7 4 an indigent prisoner forwarded his peti-
tion for a state writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of his
arrest. The clerk refused to docket the petition without the pay-
ment of a $4 filing fee.75 The petitioner's appeal to the state
supreme court was denied. The United States Supreme Court
denied appeal but treated the papers as a petition for certiorari,
which was granted. The court had no difficulty in finding a viola-
70 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963).
7142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1959). See also Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners:
The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985, 987 (1962).
7 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
73The United States Supreme Court, however, recognized the power of the
District Court in a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 to dis-
pose of the matter as law and justice require.
7' 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
75 IowA CODE ANN. (Cum. Supp. 1960) § 606.15 provides in part that "the clerk
of the district court shall charge and collect . . . (f) filing any petition . .
and docketing the same, four dollars."
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tion of the equal protection of laws guaranteed to the petitioner by
the Fourteenth Amendment. "There is no rational basis for assum-
ing that indigents' motion for leave to appeal will be less merit-
orious than those of other defendants. ... The imposition by the
State of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate
review for indigent criminal defendants has no place in our heritage
of Equal Justice Under Law. '7 6
The respondent (warden) in United States ex rel. Bongeorno v.
Ragen77 claimed that a federal writ of habeas corpus was inappro-
priate because all state remedies, including appellate remedies in
the state courts and the United States Supreme Court, had not been ex-
hausted. The federal district court allowed the petition on the ground
that the prison warden had denied permission to send the petition for
more than two years.
RESTRICTIONS MAKING ACCESS MORE DIFFICULT
Direct access to the courts has been protected as a federal right.
Prison regulations, however, which are concerned with rights that
are ancillary to the right of access have often been found not to be
protected. The federal courts have been hesitant to interfere with
the administration of state penal institutions unless a prisoner's
Constitutional rights have clearly been violated.
Application of Chessman7 8 indicated that prisoners have the right
to prompt and timely access to the mails for the purpose of trans-
mitting statements of fact which attempt to show any ground for
relief. Nonetheless, the court decided that prisoners have no en-
forceable right to engage in legal research. The federal district
court in Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden7 9 admonished a peti-
tioner with the following reasoning:
If the petitioner were given an opportunity to study some
law, one of the things he would learn would be that a petition
for habeas corpus properly contains allegations of fact alone, and
that legal arguments are not a proper part thereof.8 0
Are Constitutionally guaranteed rights so fundamentally evident
that persons without prior legal training can recognize possible viola-
tions? Are not factual allegations confined to some extent by legal
theory?
76 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 710-711 (1961) citing Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
252, 257-258 (1959).
'7 54 F. Supp. 973, (N.D. Ill. 1944) aff'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1945). Cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945).
7844 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955).
79 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957).
so Id. at 912.
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Hatfield v. Bailleaux8l sets out many of the ancillary prison re-
strictions which the federal courts have held not to involve denial
of reasonable access to the courts. Suit was commenced by seven
inmates to enjoin the enforcement of certain prison regulations and
to enjoin certain customs and usages that had arisen incident to
these regulations. The federal district court granted the injunction
sought. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals the judg-
ment was reversed and the cause remanded with directions to
dismiss.
The court defined access to the courts as "the opportunity to
prepare, serve and file whatever pleadings or other documents are
necessary or appropriate in order to commence or prosecute court
proceedings affecting one's personal liberty ... and to send and
receive communications to and from judges, courts and lawyers
concerning such matters. 8 2 All the surrounding circumstances
were taken into consideration in determining whether reasonable
access was afforded.
Prisoners who were confined to the isolation ward were not
allowed to communicate with legal counsel or a judge of a court
unless an action was already pending, and then only in the discre-
tion of prison authorities. They were not allowed to study legal
materials or prepare legal documents. The court held these restric-
tions to be reasonable, based on the relatively short period of the
isolation coupled with its purposes as a punishment. The court
found that isolation was not imposed to discriminate against those
engaged in legal work nor was it arbitrarily imposed.
Members of the general prison population were prohibited from
preparing or possessing legal materials in their cells, although they
were allowed to keep and read non-legal materials. They were
allowed to correspond and retain correspondence if no legal cita-
tions were contained therein. All legal study and materials were
confined to the prison library which was open thirty hours a week
by appointment for three hour periods. Inmates were prohibited
from acquiring bound law books of any kind. Again the court up-
held these regulations as non-violative of reasonable access to the
courts. At the time of trial increased library facilities had ended a
backlog"3 in library appointments. This was a possible factor in
the determination that the regulations and the prison practices
incident thereto were reasonable.
81290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961). Cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
82 Id. at 637.
83 Occasional delays of more than three or four days and up to seventeen days
occurred between the time an appointment was sought and the time use of
the facilities was actually obtained. Id. at 638.
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Rationale for the regulations was centered primarily around the
discouragement of jail-house lawyers.
[I]f permitted to engage in such practice, aggressive inmates
of superior intelligence exploit and dominate weaker prison-
ers of inferior intelligence. The practice also tends to develop
a group of inmate leaders, which is discouraged in allinstitutions."
Should these cogent administrative prison interests be held para-
mount to the interest of protecting fundamental Constitutional rights?
Hatfield explored many factors before reaching the conclusion
that reasonable access to the courts had not been denied. Such detailed
remarks which are in conflict with the basic principles underlying
habeas corpus.
State authorities have no obligation under the federal Con-
stitution to provide library facilities and an opportunity for
their use to enable an inmate to search for legal loopholes in
the judgment and sentence under which he is held, or to
perform services which only a lawyer is trained to perform.
All inmates are presumed to be confined under valid judg-
ments and sentences. If an inmate believes he has a meritor-
ious reason for attacking his, he must be given an oppor-
tunity to do so. But he has not due process right to spend
his prison time or utilize prison facilities in an effort to
discover a ground for overturning a presumptively valid
judgment. 5
Are all prisoners seeking review by habeas corpus really at-
tempting to circumvent justice through "loopholes"? Is it humanly
possible for any prisoner to ever seek review by habeas corpus
without some use of prison time or prison facilities? Is not due
process, which guarantees prisoners access to the courts, retarded
if a prisoner is forced to approach that court unprepared? Should
the definition of due process expand once more to guarantee to
prisoners not only a forum, but also words to employ when they
reach that forum?
CONCLUSION
Courts are constantly defining and redefining the areas in which
the writ of habeas corpus is available. Expanded use of this writ
will force state courts to tighten and police their courtroom pro-
cedures.88 Such policing will lessen the need for future state as well
as federal writs. Policing, however, must not be restricted to court
procedure. Prison regulations and practices which surround them
84 Id. at 639.
85 Id. at 641.
86 See Wis. STAT. § 974.06 (1967).
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must be constantly scrutinized, even to the point of federal interference
if necessary.
The definition of what constitutes the right to access to the
courts must expand to encompass the peripheral areas of such
access. The right to access is no right at all unless the petitioner
has received every possible opportunity to reach the court prepared
to logically present his grievances.
Reform is necessary to lighten the enormous administrative
problems created by the tremendous influx of habeas corpus writs.
Such reform should concentrate on a realistic state post-conviction
procedure rather than on antiquated prison regulations which stifle
fundamental Constitutional rights.
ROBERT C. ROTH
